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In this paper, we present a dynamic optimizing model that allows explic-
itly for imperfect substitutability between diﬀerent ﬁnancial assets. This is
speciﬁed in a manner which captures Tobin’s (1969) view that an expansion
of one asset’s supply aﬀects both the yield on that asset and the spread or
“risk premium” between returns on that asset and alternative assets. Our
estimates of this model on U.S. data conﬁrm that some of the observed devi-
ations of long-term rates from the expectations theory of the term structure
can be traced to movements in the relative stocks of ﬁnancial assets. The
richer aggregate demand and asset speciﬁcations imply that there exists an
additional channel of monetary policy. Our results suggest that central bank
operations exercise a modest inﬂuence on the relative prices of alternative
ﬁnancial securities, and so exert an extra eﬀect on long-term yields and ag-
gregate demand separate from their eﬀect on the expected path of short-term
rates.
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A central message of James Tobin’s “General Equilibrium Approach to Mon-
e t a r yT h e o r y ”w a st h a t“ [ t ] h e r ei sn or e a s o nt ot h i n kt h a tt h ei m p a c t[ o f
monetary policy] will be captured in any single [variable]..., whether it is a
monetary stock or a market interest rate” (Tobin 1969, p. 29). This message
was a departure from both the simplest quantity-theory setup–where nom-
inal aggregate demand moves in step with the nominal stock of money–and
the traditional IS-LM framework, where the aggregate demand for output
depends on a single, representative interest rate.
In many respects, the “New Keynesian” or dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium models (DSGE models) used today (see Walsh 2003, and Wood-
ford 2003, for extended treatments) represent advances on the models that
Tobin criticized. For example, in contrast to the simple quantity theory, the
LM relationship in the New Keynesian model implies an interest-elastic and
stochastic velocity function. And as Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and
Svensson (2000) emphasize, the presence of forward-looking behavior in the
optimizing IS equation means that aggregate demand can be interpreted as
depending on a type of long-term real interest rate. In that sense, modern
models do admit a distinction between diﬀerent asset yields. In addition, in
1contrast to Tobin’s work, these functions are worked out from explicit sto-
chastic optimization problems of agents, while the aggregate supply portion
of the model–typically based on Calvo (1983) staggered price contracts–
improves on the absence of an aggregate supply speciﬁcation in Tobin (1969).
At a deeper level, however, New Keynesian systems are vulnerable to
Tobin’s criticism of earlier-generation models. While a (real) “long-term
rate” appears in the model, it does so only as a stand-in for the expectation of
the path of the current (real) short rate. Deviations of the long-term interest
rate from the expectations theory of the term structure are not recognized.
In eﬀect, the arbitrage relations in the model restore the two-asset structure
of traditional IS-LM, leaving a framework like that Tobin criticized, where
“all nonmonetary assets and debts are... taken to be perfect substitutes at a
common interest rate plus or minus exogenous interest diﬀerentials” (Tobin
1982, p. 179).
In this paper, we develop the New Keynesian model to allow explicitly
for imperfect substitutability between diﬀerent ﬁnancial assets. As Kashyap
(1999, p. 190) noted, “Tobin has long pushed the view that diﬀerent secu-
rities should be treated diﬀerently,” and we represent this view by allowing
for imperfect substitutability between short-term and long-term ﬁnancial se-
2curities. Furthermore, we specify the imperfect substitutability in a manner
which allows for Tobin’s view that an expansion of one asset’s supply af-
fects both the yield on that asset and the spread or “risk premium” between
returns on that asset and alternative assets.
Policy debates in recent years have given these issues a prominence that
was absent when Tobin’s paper was ﬁrst published. Macroeconomic model-
ing after 1969 tended not to follow up the implications of imperfect substitu-
tion between assets, with notable exceptions including Brunner and Meltzer
(1973) and B. Friedman (1976, 1978). This probably reﬂected the conve-
nience of the perfect-substitute baseline, especially for dynamic general equi-
librium analysis; and also the fact that many of the key debates of the past
three decades–e.g. the natural rate hypothesis, staggered contracts, and in-
ﬂation bias–focused on the aggregate supply speciﬁcation (i.e. price/output
interaction, rather than output/interest-rate interaction). For these debates,
how private reactions split a policy-induced injection of nominal spending
into prices and output was of ﬁrst-order importance; how monetary policy
creates the additional spending is second-order.
Recent discussions of the monetary transmission mechanism have restored
the speciﬁcation of aggregate demand to a ﬁrst-order issue. The possibility
3that short- and long-term securities are imperfect substitutes has become an
issue in monetary policy discussions in the U.S. In a speech on November 21,
2002, Federal Open Market Committee member Ben S. Bernanke considered
the channels for monetary expansion available to the Federal Reserve beyond
lowering the federal funds rate. He observed: “One relatively straightforward
extension of current procedures would be to try to stimulate spending by
lowering rates further out along the Treasury term structure–that is, rates
on government bonds of longer maturities.” While noting that one route
t h r o u g hw h i c ht h eF e dm i g h ta c h i e v et h i sg o a li sb yt h et e r m - s t r u c t u r ee x -
pectations channel, Bernanke suggested that historical experience suggested
a second, less conventional channel was available. This was one where money
creation exerts additional eﬀects on the long rate, for a given path of the short
rate, so that central bank purchases of long-term securities (his proposed op-
eration) reduce long rates relative to the expected path of short rates . In
emphasizing this channel, Bernanke was endorsing a central message of Tobin
(1969): the inﬂuence of central bank actions on aggregate demand cannot be
summarized by a single yield, the short-term interest rate, but are reﬂected
in a variety of asset yields.1 That position, in turn, rests on a model where
1This position is, of course, closely related to the monetarist transmission mechanism
advanced in (e.g.) Brunner and Meltzer (1973) and Friedman and Schwartz (1982). B.
4diﬀerent securities are imperfect substitutes for one another.2
More formally, in this paper we modify our previous model (Andrés,
López-Salido and Nelson 2003, henceforth ALSN) in three main respects.
First, we add a long-term bond market. Second, we will have two kinds of
agents, consisting of a fraction of unrestricted households who can trade in
both short-term and long-term securities markets, with the remaining frac-
tion only able to trade in the market for long-term bonds. Finally, we allow
for deviations from the expectations theory. In particular, we depart from the
expectations theory in two respects. First, we include an exogenous term-
premium shock. Secondly, and more important, we allow for the presence
of a portfolio-balance term which creates a role for money (or a money/long-
term debt ratio) in the equation linking short and long rates. Together, these
modiﬁcations to the standard model make long rates matter directly, not
only via the relation of these to the expectations of short rates, in both the
IS and the LM functions. This produces an additional channel of monetary
Friedman (1976) provides an early discussion of the links between Tobin’s and the mone-
tarists’ views on monetary transmission.
2The sense in which our model validates Bernanke’s experiment is discussed further
in Section 4. The Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury did seek to inﬂuence long-
term government bond rates for a given path of short rates during the “Operation Twist”
program of the Kennedy Administration. This operation, which attempted to alter the
relative supplies of government debt, was inﬂuenced by Tobin’s early work on imperfect
substitution (e.g. Tobin, 1961). It diﬀered, however, from the operation described by
Bernanke because no expansion of the monetary base was involved in Operation Twist.
5policy, as base money expansion now relieves portfolio constraints and lowers
long rates in the short run relative to the average of expected future short
rates.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out our modiﬁcation of
the standard New Keynesian model to allow for imperfect substitutability
between assets. This changes the LM and term-structure relationships in the
model, but still leaves a single interest rate in the IS function. Section 3 in-
troduces a further modiﬁcation in the form of heterogeneity between agents,
and so puts multiple rates in the aggregate IS relation. Section 4 provides
empirical estimates of the model and studies its quantitative properties. Sec-
tion 5 concludes.
2 A Model with Imperfect Asset Substitutabil-
ity
We assume a continuum of inﬁnitely-lived households, indexed by i ∈ [0,1],
a government, and a continuum of producing ﬁrms indexed by j ∈ [0,1].
We abstract from capital accumulation. The model will display suﬃcient
symmetry for our analysis to focus on the behavior of both a representative
consumer and a goods-producing ﬁrm. The model is a generalization of that
6we used in ALSN (2003). The generalizations allow for a distinct long-term
securities market, as well as suﬃcient frictions to incorporate long rates in
the LM function (and, in Section 3, the IS function). We consider ﬁrst a
perfect-substitute baseline version of the model. Then we introduce ﬁnancial
frictions that make short- and long-term bonds imperfect substitutes,a n d
we discuss the implications that alternative preference speciﬁcations have on
both the money demand relationship and the term structure of interest rates.
We will show that they imply that now nominal long rates play an explicit
role in the LM function.
Except for the presence of alternative degree of sustitutability among as-
sets, our framework consists of a standard dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium model with staggered price setting à la Calvo (1983). We now describe
the objectives and constraints of these diﬀerent agents, paying special atten-
tion to the speciﬁcation of household’s preferences.
2.1 Households
Households have access to both short- and long-term securities markets, i.e.
they can trade in markets for both one-period and L-period securities. We
will start with our baseline economy, where we assume that assets are perfect
substitutes, then we model imperfect sustitutability among assets, bringing
7out the implications for money demand and the term structure of interest
rates.
2.1.1 Baseline Case: Perfect Asset Substitution
Let Ct and Nt represent consumption and hours worked by households in
period t.3 Preferences are deﬁned by the discount factor β ∈ (0,1) and a




































































where Mt/Pt represents real balances of the household; at is a preference
shock, and et is a shock to the household’s demand for real balances. The
parameter β ∈ (0,1) is a discount factor, σ > 0 governs relative risk aversion,
ϕ ≥ 0 represents the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity, and ﬁnally
δ > 0, d>0, and c>0. In line with the empirical evidence provided by
3Because there is a continuum of consumption goods available for purchase (see Section
2.2), Ct corresponds to a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of consumption.
8Ireland (2002), Andrés, López-Salido, and Vallés (2001), and our own work,
ALSN (2003), we impose separability among consumption, real balances,
and hours, and allow for habit formation in consumption. In addition, we
incorporate the presence of portfolio adjustment cost through the function
G(.). This functional form for portfolio adjustment costs, used by Nelson
(2002) and ALSN (2003), is that of Christiano and Gust (1999), modiﬁed to
refer to real balances and applied to a model without “limited participation”
features.4 Below we will analyze its implications for money demand.
The budget constraint each period is:










Households enter period t with money holdings Mt−1 and maturing one-
period bond holdings Bt−1, and maturing L-period bonds, BL,t−L,t h a tt h e y
purchased in period t − L. At the beginning of the period, they receive
4Whether adjustment costs should be expressed in real or nominal terms was a concern
of the classic study of Goldfeld (1973). If the transaction motive is the sole reason for
holding money, and the costs correspond to literal payments for converting nonmoney
assets into cash, then a nominal speciﬁcation is appropriate. On the other hand, if money
provides a service as a safe asset distinct from its transaction role (a “temporary abode of
purchasing power” in the words of Friedman and Schwartz (1982), or Modigliani’s (1944)
“reserve against contingencies” ), this service can motivate a cost function speciﬁed in real
t e r m s ,a n dt h i si st h es p e c i ﬁcation we favor. Throughout this paper, just as we specify the
basic services from money using a money-in-the-utility function speciﬁcation, we specify
adjustment costs involving money directly in the utility function. Specifying the costs as
appearing in households’ intertemporal budget constraints would deliver similar results,
at the expense of more cumbersome algebra.
9lump-sum nominal transfers Tt,l a b o ri n c o m eWtNt,w h e r eWt denotes the
nominal wage, and a nominal dividend Dt from the ﬁrms. They use some





L,w h e r ert and rL,t denote their gross nominal interest rate
between t and t +1 , respectively. The household carries Mt units of money
into period t +1 .
Long-Term Bonds Long-term securities are modeled, following Sargent
(1987, pp. 102—105), as zero-coupon bonds purchased by households at the
nominal price (gross nominal interest rate) of (rL,t)L, L>1, rL,t > 1,a n d
each redeemed for one dollar in period t + L. There is no secondary market
for these bonds, and so they must be held by their purchaser to maturity.
Both short- and long-term securities are solely for loans to the government.5
Relative to long-term securities traded in practice, our speciﬁcation fea-
tures two obvious simpliﬁcations. First, we have no coupon payments re-
ceived by agents during the period they hold the bond. Second, there is no
secondary market for long-term bonds, and so no possibility of obtaining a
capital gain or loss by trading in existing securities. Both assumptions are
5As usual, the government bond market speciﬁed in the model is really a stand-in for
the markets for loans to both government and large corporations that exist in practice.
10for simplicity, but have some further justiﬁcation. The absence of a coupon
p a y m e n ti si nl i n ew i t hm u c ho ft h et r e a t m e n to fl o n g - t e r mb o n d si nm a c r o -
economic models (e.g. Svensson 2000). The absence of a secondary market
can be justiﬁed by the fact that a large fraction of the nonbank private sector
holds long-term securities with the intention of keeping them to maturity.6
In addition, several empirical money demand studies have found a role for
the nominal long-term interest rate as an opportunity-cost variable. This is
consistent with the horizon of money demand decisions being long enough
that the reported yield on long-term bonds is the relevant opportunity cost.
It is inconsistent with money demand decisions being driven by movements
in the secondary prices of long-term assets, since then money demand should
be related to the holding-period yield rather than the reported yield on long
assets (Mishkin 1983). Finally, we note that if we did allow for our long-term
bonds both to be traded and yielding coupon payments, then for an L-period
bond there would be an additional 2L terms in the intertemporal budget con-
6Kuttner and Lown (1999) report that data are not available that indicate precisely how
holding of government debt by maturity is split across agents. However, they note that
commercial banks’ demand is concentrated on short-term Treasury securities. Pension
funds, on the other hand are “signiﬁcant buyers of long-maturity securities,” as Bruskin,
Sanders, and Sykes (2000, p. 15) note. Moreover, this demand comes precisely because
long-term government bonds are high-quality assets that can be held for a long maturity:
when in 2001 the prospect was raised of all U.S. government debt eventually being paid
oﬀ, this was seen as a dilemma for pension funds and insurance companies, as switching to
short-maturity assets would create a mismatch between the maturity of their assets and
liabilities (IMF 2001, p. 95).
11straint and in the optimality condition for long-term bond holding, clearly
an intractable speciﬁcation for large L.
Optimality Conditions The ﬁrst-order conditions for the optimizing con-
sumer’s problem can be written as:









































where Ut,Ct = ∂Ut
∂Ct, Ut+1,Ct =
∂Ut+1
∂Ct , Vt,Mt = ∂Vt
∂Mt, Gt,Mt = ∂Gt
∂Mt and Gt+1,Mt =
∂Gt+1
∂Mt .
Equation (4) is the standard expression for the marginal utility of wealth
(i.e., the Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint), which, in the pres-
ence of habit formation, will depend upon both the marginal utility of con-
sumption today and the expected marginal utility of consumption tomorrow.
This relationship is aﬀected by the presence of pref e r e n c es h o c k sa tt i m et
and time t +1 . Expression (5) is the labor supply schedule, relating real
12wages to the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and hours.
Expressions (6) and (7) correspond to the Euler equations for bond hold-
ings at diﬀerent maturities, and so link the marginal utility of wealth across
periods. As we will show below, implicitly in those expressions is a term-
structure relationship linking the interest rates on short-term and long-term
bonds.
Finally, combining equations (7) and (8), we can obtain an expression for
money demand, i.e. a relation linking nominal interest rates to the marginal
rate of substitution between money and wealth:








Notice that the presence of the portfolio adjustment costs, G(.),s h i f t st h e
standard money-demand decision from being static to one where expectations
of real income and nominal interest rates matter for today’s portfolio decision
(see the term in braces in the previous expression).
2.1.2 Imperfect Substitutability
We now modify our baseline model to allow for imperfect substitutability be-
tween assets. In the modiﬁed version, households face two frictions when par-
ticipating in these markets. First, there are time-varying, stochastic trans-
13action costs in the long bond market, so households pay (1 + ζt) instead of
1 for each dollar of long-term bond purchases in t,w h e r eζt is a zero-mean
disturbance. Second, households perceive entering the long bond market
as “riskier,” entailing a loss of liquidity, relative to the same investment in
short-term securities. As they purchase long-term securities, they hold addi-
tional currency to compensate themselves for the loss of liquidity. In eﬀect,
these agents have self-imposed “reserve requirements” on their long-term in-
vestments. Formally, we specify the second friction as an additional cost
function in the households’ decision problem regarding their purchases in the











where v>0,a n dκ is the inverse of the steady-state money to debt ratio
(which implies that this new function has a zero steady-state value). Given
this speciﬁcation, the equilibrium conditions (8) and (6) now become






































As can be seen from expression (12), these two frictions aim to capture two
deviations from the pure term-structure theory of interest rates. The de-
viations were both referred to in Tobin’s work. The ζt series corresponds
to Tobin’s “exogenous interest diﬀerentials.” He believed that these shocks
were, nevertheless, only part of the wedges that created ﬂuctuations in the
relative prices of diﬀerent assets. In particular, he regarded spreads be-
tween interest rates as functions of the relative quantities of assets. This is
captured here by the presence of our second friction, the household reserve
requirement, with “liquid assets” corresponding to the monetary base, and
illiquid assets to long-term securities. Hence, in expression (12), the term
structure of interest rates is shifted by the ratio of money to long-term bond
holdings. To induce the public to hold an increase in the relative supply of
the more illiquid assets, the spread between illiquid and liquid assets is bid
up. It would probably be closer to Tobin’s position to deﬁne liquid assets
more broadly, for example to include short-term securities.7 B u tb a s em o n e y
7Such an deﬁnition would be in line with the approach of Canzoneri and Diba (2003).
In their treatment, all bonds are short-term, and additional holdings of bonds make agents
feel more liquid for any given holding of base money. Note that, because of the diﬀerent
15certainly belongs in the total, and this narrow deﬁnition of liquidity is suﬃ-
cient to capture an essential feature of Tobin’s framework, namely the extra
channel of monetary policy recently invoked by Bernanke (2002).8 Finally,
notice that this household reserve requirement also makes the relative sup-
ply of long-term bonds matter for money demand decisions; in particular, an
increase in the relative supply of more illiquid assets increases the demand
for money.
2.2 Firm Behavior and Price Setting
The production function for ﬁrm j is
Yt(j)=ztNt(j)
1−α (13)
where Yt(j) is output, Nt(j) represents the number of work-hours hired from
the household (i.e. Nt =
R 1
0 Nt(j) dj), zt is a common technology shock









The representative ﬁrm sells its output in a monopolistically competitive
characteristics of short and long-term securities, there is no incompatibility of their ap-
p r o a c hw i t ho u rs p e c i ﬁcation, in which additional long-term asset holdings make agents
feel less liquid for any given holding of base money.
8In Eggertsson and Woodford’s (2003) treatment of imperfect substitutability, state-
contingent claims markets provide insurance that eﬀectively restores the perfect-substitute
b a s e l i n e .T h ef r i c t i o nw ei n t r o d u c ec a nb er e garded as arising from agents attempting to
compensate for the absence or imperfection of these markets in practice.
16market and sets nominal prices on a staggered basis, as in Calvo (1983). Each
ﬁrm resets its price with probability 1−θ each period, independently of the
time elapsed since the last adjustment. Thus, each period a measure 1−θ of
producers resets their prices, while a fraction θ simply adjusts prices at the
pace of steady-state inﬂation, π (i.e., non-adjusting ﬁrms simply follow the
rule: Pt(j)=Pt−1(j)π). Hence, θ
k will be the probability that the price set at
time t will still hold at time t+k. Notice that, if there were no constraints on
the adjustment of prices, the typical ﬁrm would set a price according to the
rule Pt(j)=( ε
ε−1)MCt(j),w h e r eMCt(j)= Wt
∂Yt(j)
∂Nt(j)
is the nominal marginal
cost and ε
ε−1 is the steady-state price markup.








k Et {Λt,t+k Yt+k(j)( P
∗
t − Pt+k MCt+k)}








t denoting the price chosen by ﬁrms resetting prices at time t.T h e



























2.3 Government Budget Constraint
Transfer payments minus seignorage revenues are ﬁnanced issuing long-term
and short-term bonds. Assuming that there is no government spending in
























where κbL ∈ [0,1),a n d²BL,t is an i.i.d. exogenous perturbation. Thus, short-
term debt is used as a residual means of public ﬁnancing. To guarantee
dynamic stability and a unique equilibrium in the model, in which prices
are determined by monetary policy, we also assume that transfers are set







where κ ∈ (0,1). Finally, the market-clearing condition implies Yt = Ct.
182 . 4 M o n e t a r yP o l i c yR u l e
To close the model, we assume (as in Ireland 2002) that the central bank sets
the nominal interest rate following an augmented Taylor-type interest-rate
rule. In particular, the nominal rate responds not only to the interest rate
in the previous period and to deviations of output and inﬂation from their
steady-state values, but also to nominal money growth:
ln(rt/r) = ρr ln(rt−1/r)+(1 − ρr )ρπ ln(πt/π)+(1 − ρr )ρy ln(yt/y)(19)
+(1 − ρr )ρµ ln(µt/µ)+εrt
where the innovation εrt is normally distributed with standard deviation σr,
and
b µt = b mt − b mt−1 + b πt (20)
i st h er a t eo fm o n e yg r o w t h . 9 An interest-rate rule that depends on money
growth (or changes in real balances) might be rationalized, as in Rudebusch
and Svensson (2002), as a result of an optimal policy exercise when money-
growth variability appears in the central bank’s loss function. Alternatively,
t h er e s p o n s et om o n e ym i g h tb er a t i o n a l i z e db ym o n e y ’ su s e f u l n e s si nf o r e -
casting inﬂation.
9The symbol b represents percentage deviations of a variable from its steady-state
value. See below.
192.5 Log-linear Approximation
We now proceed to log-linearize the previous equations around the steady
state. The ﬁrst equation is the one for the aggregate Lagrange multiplier
which is obtained by log-linearizing equation (4),






1−βh , φ2 =
σ+(σ−1)βh2−βh
1−βh .
Log-linearizing equations (12) and (7) we obtain
b Λt = Lb rrL,t + Etb Λt+L − ζt + τ(b mt −b bL,t) (22)
b Λt = {b rt − Etb πt+1} + Etb Λt+1 = b rrt + Etb Λt+1 (23)
where
b rrt = b rt − Etb πt+1 (24)






are the short-term real interest rate, and the long-term real interest rate,
respectively; and where b mt and b bL,t are the log-deviation of households
real balances and long-term debt holdings, respectively. The parameter τ
is deﬁned as τ =
v(rL)L
ΛbL ,w i t hbL as the steady state level of household









,w ec a nw r i t eτ =
v(rL)L(r−1)
rbLm−δ .










{ζt − τ(b mt −b bL,t)} (26)
which implies that there is a deviation from the expectations theory of the
term structure. This deviation depends upon an exogenous risk premium
term and an endogenous term related to the ratio of money to long-term
bonds. Note that in the absence of the exogenous term, ζt,a n dw i t hn o







It can also be shown that a log-linear approximation to expression (11)
yields




bLδ(1 + δo(1 + β))
¶
(b mt −b bL,t) (28)
where δo = dc2
δm(1−δ), µ1 = δo









1+δo(1+β). This is a generalization of the standard
expression for money demand. The generalization has two aspects. First, the
21presence of imperfect substitutability implies that real balances depend upon
the relative quantity of money and long-term bonds. Second, the presence
of portfolio adjustment costs, G(.), implies that real balances also depend
on past and expected future real balances (i.e. by setting these costs equal
to zero, d =0 , the previous expression will collapse into an static money
demand equation).
Finally, notice that using (26), we can substitute out the relative asset
quantity, and so money demand can be written as a function of the present
discounted value of short-term rates as well as long-term rates:











(rL)Lδ(1+δo(1+β)).T h i ss p e c i ﬁcation is therefore a generaliza-
tion of the standard money demand relationships examined in the literature,
where money demand now incorporates forward-looking elements, and, due
to the existence of imperfect substitution between short and long securities,
an explicit inﬂuence of both short- and long-term interest rates. Note that
only the exogenous component of the transaction costs, ζt, will appear as
part of the money demand function; the remaining terms can be expressed
in the form of interest rates.
22Completing the model
It can be shown that around a zero steady-state inﬂation rate, the log-
linearized supply-side equations are given by
b πt = βEt{b πt+1} + e λc mct (30)
c mct =( χ + φ2)b yt − φ1b yt−1 − βφ1Etb yt+1 −
βh(1 − ρa)
(1 − βh)
b at − (1 + χ)b zt (31)
where χ =
ϕ+α
1−α, e λ =
(1−θ)(1−βθ)
θ ξ,a n dξ =
(1−α)
1+α(ε−1) (see, for instance, Galí,
Gertler, and López-Salido 2001, and Andrés, López-Salido, and Vallés 2001).
Because of the presence of habits formation, marginal costs are not a linear
function of output, but instead also depend on past and future output, as
well as preference and technology shocks.
We will assume that the shocks follow univariate ﬁrst-order autorregres-
sive processes, i.e.,
b at = ρab at−1 + εat (32)
b et = ρeb et−1 + εet (33)
b zt = ρzb zt−1 + εzt (34)
ζt = ρζζt−1 + εζt (35)
233 A Model with Heterogeneous Agents
The preceding framework has introduced suﬃcient frictions to introduce an
endogenous wedge into the relative price of alternative ﬁnancial assets. Long-
term interest rates cannot therefore be treated interchangeably with the ex-
pectation of short rates. But this modiﬁcation is not suﬃcient to move the
DSGE framework away from a single-interest-rate model of aggregate de-
mand determination. The reason is that, notwithstanding the existence of
long-term securities, there is no compelling reason why all households cannot
“bypass” the long-term market altogether, and simply enforce their consump-
tion plans by trading in sequences of short-term investments. In that case,
only the expectation of short rates would appear in the IS equation, and
deviations from the expectations theory of the term structure would have no
implications for aggregate demand behavior.
We therefore introduce an additional modiﬁcation to the standard model,
i nt h ef o r mo ft w ok i n d so fh o u s e h o l d s . The households are similar except
that only a fraction λ of them can trade in the both short- and long-term
bond markets, i.e. they can purchase both one-period and L-period secu-
rities. We use the term unrestricted households to refer to that subset of
households. The remaining fraction 1 − λ of households can only trade in
24the L-period securities market. We refer to these agents as the restricted
households. Furthermore, in this modiﬁed version of the model, only the
unrestricted households face the two frictions when participating in long-
term bond markets, i.e. only the unrestricted agents regard long-term bonds
as imperfect substitutes for money.
Before introducing this modiﬁcation formally, we discuss the practical im-
plications of the modiﬁcation and defend its realism. The practical eﬀect of
this modiﬁcation is that the real long-term interest rate unambiguously “mat-
ters” in the aggregate IS equation, in a distinct manner from the expectation
of short rates. Together with the assumption of imperfect substitutability,
this means that central-bank open-market purchases exert two distinct inﬂu-
ences on aggregate demand: eﬀects operating via the reaction of current and
expected future values of the real short-term interest rate; and eﬀects on the
risk premium connecting the real long-term interest rate to expected short
rates.
Regarding the realism of this modiﬁcation, we note that while house-
holds in practice do not literally dichotomize into restricted and unrestricted
agents, our speciﬁcation does capture important aspects of the holding of
debt by the private sector. The unrestricted agents in our model can be
25thought of as standing in for that portion of the private sector that car-
ries out most of its saving decisions through commercial bank deposits; the
restricted households, as those agents who subscribe directly to long-term
government bonds or who save heavily through such agencies as pension
funds. Commercial banks tend to be averse to holding long-term securities,
due to their perceived lack of liquidity; nonbank holders of long-term govern-
ment debt, on the other hand, do not see the same risks in holding long-term
assets, mainly because they plan to “cash in” these assets at maturity and
do not plan to dispose of them prior to the maturity date. In light of such
factors, Congdon (1982, p. 42) notes of the UK situation, “Treasury bills are
taken up predominantly be the banking system, and gilts [long-term govern-
ment bonds] by the nonbank public...” Similarly, for the U.S., Kuttner and
Lown (1999, pp. 170—171) report that as of 1997 the share of Federal govern-
ment debt held by commercial banks and pension funds was roughly equal,
and argue that “a major factor behind banks’ demand” is the “exceptional
liquidity of [short-maturity] Treasury securities...” Our setup reﬂects key as-
pects of this situation: a fraction of agents who can deal in both short- and
long-term instruments but regard the latter as risky; and another fraction
who prefer long-term bonds as their savings vehicle and for whom these risk
26considerations are not present.
Formally, the unrestricted households’ problem is the one we have solved
so far. The restricted households’ optimality conditions, on the other hand,
are diﬀerent since the Euler equation on short-term bonds does not apply to
them.
3.1 Implications for Aggregate Demand
We ﬁrst obtain an expression for the aggregate Lagrange multiplier. We
proceed as follows. The Lagrange multiplier for the unrestricted households
satisﬁes equations (22) and (23). Without loss of generality, we can write
these equations in the following way:
b Λ
u
t = Lb rrL,t + Etb Λ
u









t = τ(b mu
t −b bu
L,t) is a term that captures the degree of imperfect sub-
stitution between money and long-term bonds. In addition, the equilibrium
condition for the Lagrange multiplier of the restricted households is
b Λ
r
t = Lb rrL,t + Etb Λ
r
t+L (38)
Deﬁne the aggregate Lagrange multiplier as b Λt = λb Λu
t +(1−λ)b Λr
t.F r o m












Hence, from the deﬁnition of the aggregate Lagrange multiplier and expres-
sions (36) and (38) we obtain an aggregate multiplier given by
b Λt = λ{Φ
u
t − ζt} + Lb rrL,t + Etb Λt+L (40)
Notice that from expression (39) we have that
{Φ
u
t − ζt} =
L−1 X
j=0
b rrt+j − Lb rrL,t
which leads to the following expression for b Λt:






+( 1− λ)Lb rrL,t + Etb Λt+L (41)
From the previous expression, it is straightforward to obtain the implica-
tions for the dynamic IS equation of the model. Combining equations (21)
and (41) yields to an expression for the IS equation, which is a function of
both short-term and long-term real rates:
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28This expression can be written in a compact way as follows:
φ2(1 − F
L)b yt = φ1(1 − F














where F is the forward operator. As in a standard IS equation, aggregate
demand is written as a function of real rates and an IS shock; and as in
the standard Euler equation, spending decisions are forward-looking. With
homogeneous agents and perfect substitution between assets, it would be pos-
sible to collapse this expression into a second-order expectational diﬀerence
equation involving output and the short real rate. With imperfect asset
substitution and heterogeneity, the conditions for these simpliﬁcations are
not satisﬁed; and a more general relationship, linking output to two distinct
interest rates and L-period-ahead expected output, prevails.
We now derive an expression for aggregate money demand (an LM func-
tion). We ﬁrst note that the unrestricted agents’ money demand equation
may be written as:
b m
u
t = µ1b m
u
















b πt+1 + µ5b et + µ6{Lb rrL,t −
L−1 X
j=0
{b rrt+j} − ζt} (43)
29while restricted agents’ money demand is the simpler expression:
b m
r
t = µ1b m
r
















Etb πt+1 + µ5b et (44)
The aggregate money demand equation is therefore:
b mt = µ1b mt−1 + µ2Etb mt+1 +
µ3
1 − β







+µ5b et + λµ6{Lb rrL,t −
L−1 X
j=0
{b rrt+j} − ζt}. (45)
With no adjustment costs, perfect asset substitution, and agent homo-
geneity, this condition would collapse into a static money demand relation-
ship linking real balances to current output and the current nominal interest
rate. Relative to this baseline, there are two extensions: (i) portfolio adjust-
ment costs mean that lagged and expected future real balances appear; and
(ii) imperfect asset substitution puts long rates in money demand.
F i n a l l y ,w en o t et h a to n c ea g e n th e t e r o g e n e i t yi sa l l o w e df o r ,t h ep o r t f o l i o
term that creates deviations from the expectations theory of the term struc-
ture is the unrestricted agents’ real money/real long term-debt ratio, rather
than the aggregate ratio. In order to have a model suitable for estimation
with aggregate data, our estimated system of equations uses aggregate real
money rather than unrestricted agents’ money in this condition. We have
30veriﬁed by simulation that, if imperfect substitution is present, one should
expect to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive estimated value of τ even when proxy-
ing unrestricted agents’ money holdings in this condition by aggregate real
money.
3.2 An Alternative Speciﬁcation of Heterogeneity
In this section we show the implications of an alternative speciﬁcation of
the restricted agents’ decision problem. In this modiﬁed version, we could
treat the two types of agents more symmetrically by making money and long-
term bonds imperfect substitutes for both. What are the implications for
aggregate demand of a version of the model in which both the unrestricted
households and the restricted households face the two frictions when partici-
pating in the long-term bonds market?
Formally, this will imply that the endogenous term Φt = τ(b mt −b bL,t),i s
common to all households; equations (36) and (38) therefore become identi-
cal, and so the aggregate expression for the Lagrange multiplier is as follows:
b Λt = Lb rrL,t + Etb Λt+L − ζt + Φt
In addition, using expression (39) we can substitute out the stochastic term
−ζt + Φt from the previous expression. Hence, the aggregate Lagrange mul-








Therefore, aggregate demand can be written either as depending on the






. The latter representation shows that if attitudes to risk are
perfectly symmetric across households, a single-interest-rate IS equation is
restored. Our result that the relative price of ﬁnancial assets is a function of
money and debt stocks remains, but there are nevertheless no implications for
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. This result demonstrates
the three key modiﬁcations of the DSGE framework we have introduced that
deliver a multiple-channels model of monetary policy: (i) agent heterogeneity
i nt h em a n n e rw eh a v es p e c i ﬁed; (ii) imperfect substitution on the part of
the unrestricted agents; and (iii) a lower degree of imperfect substitutability
for the restricted agents, i.e. those agents who have access to long-term
markets only, do not regard these assets with as much risk as do those who
t r a d ei nb o t hm a r k e t s . 10 All three conditions are required; if either (i) or
10The formal requirement for condition (iii) is that the parameter v is lower for the
restricted agents. In line with this requirement, in our speciﬁcation of imperfect substi-
tutability other than in this section, we have imposed v = 0 for the restricted agents. A
value of v that was positive for the both agent types but lower for the restricted agents,
would also deliver multiple channels of monetary policy. The reason that this is not our
32(iii) is violated, the single-interest-rate mechanism case λ =1obtains; if (ii)
is violated, both short and long rates matter for aggregate demand, and the
wedge between short and long rates is time-varying, but monetary policy
cannot aﬀect this wedge.
3.3 Discussion
Note that our model embodies three special cases:
Baseline two-asset model (λ =1 , Φu
t =0 ).. This is the perfect-
substitute version of the model. All households are unrestricted. Monetary
policy operates on long rates only via the expectations channel, and long
rates only matter for aggregate demand via their relation to short rates.11
Exogenous interest diﬀerentials model (λ < 1, Φu
t =0 ) This is
the imperfect-substitute model without the second friction. Deviations from
the expectations theory of short rates matter for real long rates and so for
aggregate demand, but the deviations are not related to other macroeconomic
baseline speciﬁcation of the restricted agents’ problem is that money and debt stocks then
appear directly in the IS equation, which seems contrary to Tobin’s (and others’) view of
the eﬀect of imperfect substitutability. Tobin (1974, p. 89) maintained that it did not
imply “strong, direct eﬀects of the quantity of money... which bypass credit and securities
markets...” Rather, as in our preferred speciﬁcation, imperfect substitutability changes
the asset-pricing relationships and not the IS equation. In addition, econometric evidence
is unfavorable for money terms appearing directly in the optimizing IS equation (Ireland
2002; ALSN 2003).
11As noted in Section 3.2, the case (λ =1 , Φu
t > 0) also implies a single interest-rate
channel, and occurs if both types of agents face identical costs in switching between money
and long-term bonds.
33aggregates. Monetary policy continues to operate only via its eﬀect on the
expected path of short rates.
Multiple-channels model (λ < 1, Φu
t 6=0 ). Base money expansion
now matters for the deviations of long rates from the expected path of short
rates. Monetary policy operates by both the expectations channel (the path
of current and expected future short rates) and this additional channel. As in
Tobin’s framework, interest-rate spreads (speciﬁcally, the deviations from the
pure expectations theory of the term structure) are an endogenous function
of the relative quantities of assets supplied.
4 Maximum Likelihood Estimates
The maximum likelihood estimation follows Hansen and Sargent (1997) and
recent applications can be found in Kim (2000) and Ireland (2001, 2002,
2003). The procedure involves expressing the stationary solution of the model
in state-space form and estimating the model’s parameters using a recursive
Kalman ﬁlter algorithm (see Ireland 2002 for details).12
We use U.S. quarterly data for 1980:1—1999:2. The series used in the esti-
mation are: real GDP; the quarterly average of Anderson and Rasche’s (2000)
12A detailed description of the solution and estimation methods is available upon re-
quest.
34domestic monetary base series; quarterly average population; the quarterly
average of the seasonally adjusted CPI; and the quarterly average of the
nominal Federal funds rate. Finally, we choose L =1 2to represent the ma-
turity of long-term interest rates, and accordingly use the 3-Year Treasury
Constant Maturity Rate three-year nominal long rate, obtained as the quar-
terly average of the 3-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate. The sources
for these data are the appendix to Ireland (2002) and the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis’s FRED database.13 Figure 1 displays the data we use in
estimation.14
The log-linearized optimizing model that we estimate refers to deviations
of variables from their steady-state values (or steady-state growth paths in
the case of output and real money), rather than the levels of variables. Fol-
lowing Ireland (2002), we have detrended output and real balances sepa-
rately prior to estimation. Inﬂation and nominal interest rates also exhibit
a (downward) trend over our sample; nevertheless, we continue to use the
(demeaned) levels of these variables in estimation, on the grounds that the
13http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/data/GS3.txt
14We do not include public debt in the estimated model; therefore, the dynamics of
the risk premium (ζt) should be interpreted as incorporating both the exogenous term-
premium disturbance and the dynamics of long-term bonds. This simpliﬁcation reduces
the number of exogenous sources of ﬂuctuations in the model, but it does not aﬀect the
identiﬁcation of the structural parameters.
35trends may be reduced or eliminated when these variables are cast as linear
combinations (e.g. as a real interest rate). The model consists of equations
(19), (20), (24), (25), (30), (31), (32)-(35), (39), (41) and (45), and we are
interested in estimating the parameters σ, h, β, δ, δ0, λ, τ, χ, e λ, ρπ, ρy, ρµ,
ρr, ρe, ρa, ρz, ρζ, σa, σe, σz, σr, σζ.
In Table 1, we present the parameter estimates for the model incorpo-
rating all theoretical restrictions described above. Initial attempts to esti-
mate all the parameters led to implausible combinations of the preference
parameters σ and h and to values of ρr that were high compared to other
studies. We therefore have set these parameters’ values equal to 2, 0.9 and
0.75 respectively (in line with the evidence provided by ALSN, 2003); con-
straining σ also follows Ireland (2002). The main result in Table 1 is that we
ﬁnd supporting evidence for our heterogeneous-agent imperfect-substitution
framework: in particular the value of τ =0 .54 is clearly signiﬁcant, and the
fraction of unrestricted agents (λ) is estimated to be around 0.29.T h i sf r a c -
tion is in keeping with the notion that a subset of the private sector deals
predominantly with both long-term and short-term investments; according
to our estimate, these agents form about 29 percent of households.
We ﬁnd substantial deviations from the expectations theory of the term
36structure. These take the form both of exogenous, persistent deviations with
an AR(1) parameter of 0.8, and of endogenous variations related to asset
stocks. The latter, implied by our positive estimate of τ,c o n ﬁrms the pres-
ence of the imperfect substitutability that Tobin (1969) emphasized, and the
existence of the channel of monetary transmission invoked in recent U.S. pol-
icy debates. This channel is of a reasonable magnitude–the partial impact
of a 1 percent increase in real monetary base on the annualized nominal long-
term interest rate, given expected short rates, is 4τ/L =0 .18, i.e. about 18
basis points–and serves to supplement the traditional expectations channel.
This is broadly consistent with Evans and Marshall (1998, pp. 73—74), who
ﬁnd that there is some support for the position that monetary policy shocks
aﬀect long rates both by the expectations channel and by eﬀects on term
premia.
From the estimated parameters φ2, µ3,a n dµ4 we can draw an estimate of
the long-run income elasticity of money demand close to 1 that is consistent
with many previous U.S. studies.15 Our estimates also conﬁrm that money
demand has a non-negligible forward-looking element, as the signiﬁcant value
15The assumption of separability between consumption and real balances implies that
the income and interest elasticity of money demand, are very tightly related (see e.g.
Ireland 2002). Thus, the implied interest rate elasticity is around 2.
37of δ0 obtained indicates. This eﬀect can be rationalized in terms of the
importance of adjustment costs for holding money balances, in line with the
previous results in ALSN (2003).
Another interesting result is the one related to the slope of the aggregate
supply equation. We ﬁnd a value of e λ close to 0.015, which is in line with
the values reported by Galí, Gertler, and López-Salido (2001). In particular,
under a standard value of 2/3 for the elasticity of output with respect to
hours, 1−α, and assuming a 10 percent steady state markup (see Basu and
Fernald 1997), our estimate of the slope of the Phillips curve implies a value
for the degree of price stickiness θ =0 .74,t h a t i s , ﬁrms change prices every
four quarters, a value generally used to calibrate New Keynesian Phillips
curve (see, for instance, Woodford 2003). Finally, from the estimated value
of the parameter χ we can infer an elasticity of labor supply around 1.6,
again close to the benchmark value used in the business cycle literature (e.g.
Hall 1997).
The estimated interest-rate rule also displays many similarities with rules
already estimated in the literature. There is a modest, but signiﬁcant,
interest-rate response to output (ρy =0 .35). The response of the nominal
rate to the inﬂation rate is well above 1.0 (i.e., ρπ ≈ 2); and. ﬁnally, we also
38ﬁnd that money growth is signiﬁcant in the interest-rate rule (ρµ ≈ 1.3).16
Overall, our estimates support the multiple-transmission model of mone-
tary policy over both the perfect-substitute and exogenous-interest-diﬀerential
alternatives. It does so in a model that shares many quantitative features
with calibrated as well as with estimated general equilibrium monetary mod-
els of the U.S. economy. We now illustrate some dynamic implications of the
estimated model.
4.1 Comparative Dynamics
To illustrate the richer transmission of monetary policy in our imperfect-
substitution framework, we characterize the adjustment of the economy to
exogenous monetary policy shocks. We consider ﬁrst a shock to the interest
rate. Figure 2 displays the responses of the main variables to a monetary
policy contraction under the estimated rule. In each panel we plot the dy-
namic adjustment to the variables in the estimated imperfect-substitution
model (circled line) and in the standard two-asset model (continuous line).
Notice that the estimated model has suﬃcient price stickiness to produce a
liquidity eﬀect, i.e., both nominal and real short-term interest rates move in
16This term may be approximating either genuine money targeting by the central bank,
or a way of targeting future inﬂation, by responding to information beyond that contained
in current πt.
39opposite directions to money growth (and real balances). In addition, the
change in the relative supply of assets generates a substantial increase in both
nominal and real long- term interest rates that generates a more pronounced
output and a slightly higher inﬂation reduction. In particular, the maximum
output decline is around 0.5 percentage points at around the third quarter
after the shock, and inﬂation initially falls by slightly less than 0.2 percent,
then progressively is restored to its steady-state value. It is interesting to
note that inﬂation response is quite persistent due to the combination of
a highly protracted output decline (because of habit formation), and a low
labor supply elasticity.
In Figure 3, we show the impulse responses when the monetary policy rule
is changed to an exogenous univariate money growth process. In particular,
we focus on the adjustment of the economy to an exogenous, permanent 1
percent increase in the nominal money stock. This experiment corresponds
closely to the “injection of reserves” experiment in Rudebusch and Svensson
(1999, p. 238). Notice that this experiment corresponds to an injection of
money in exchange for lump-sum transfers, while the proposed operation
described in Bernanke (2002) is of a switch of money for a portion of the
private sector’s holdings of long-term government bonds. Nevertheless, the
40experiment depicted here shows that our model captures Bernanke’s proposed
transmission channel in a manner that the standard model does not. Our
model generalizes the speciﬁcation of private sector behavior in a way that
makes the money/long bond stock ratio matter for long rates. Any operation
that adds to this ratio in the short run exploits this extra channel. With
prices sticky, such operations include adding to the nominal money stock for
a given debt stock (our experiment), a simultaneous addition to the nominal
money stock and a reduction in the debt stock (Bernanke’s operation), or
reducing the nominal long-term debt stock for given money. In the standard
model, none of these operations will be eﬀective in providing stimulus except
via their eﬀect on the path of the short-term interest rate; in our model, all
three provide stimulus via the imperfect-substitution channel.
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
In this paper we have generalized the standard sticky-price dynamic general
equilibrium model to incorporate a richer aggregate demand speciﬁcation.
Following Tobin (1969), we have introduced imperfect substitution between
diﬀerent types of securities. Together with other model features, this has the
eﬀect of putting long-term interest rates explicitly into the aggregate IS and
41LM functions. Our estimates of this model on U.S. data conﬁrm that some
of the observed deviations of long-term rates from the expectations theory
of the term structure can be traced to movements in the relative stocks of
ﬁnancial assets, just as claimed by Tobin (1969, 1982). The richer aggregate
demand and asset speciﬁcations imply that there exists an additional channel
of monetary policy. In the standard perfect-substitute baseline, monetary
policy can operate on long-term interest rates only via aﬀecting the expected
path of short rates. But our estimates suggest that central bank operations
also aﬀect the relative price of alternative ﬁnancial securities, and so exert
an extra eﬀect on long-term yields and aggregate demand. We have there-
fore provided an optimizing general equilibrium framework that supports the
existence of “unconventional” or “quantitative” channels of monetary policy,
of the type raised in policy discussions by Bernanke (2002).
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Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock  
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Note: Each panel shows percentage deviations of the variable from its steady 







Impulse Responses to a Money Growth Shock  
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Note: Each panel shows percentage deviations of the variable from its steady 
state value. Circle line estimated model parameters and a money growth rule, 
and continuous line perfect asset substitution model. 
 